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http://www.jstor.orgPRIVATE VERSUS SOCIAL  COSTS 
IN BRINGING SUIT 
LOUIS KAPLOW* 
T HE  enforcement  of large portions  of substantive  law is through  a legal 
system that relies on private parties to bring suit when such action is in 
their  own  best  interests.  Recent  work  has  analyzed  the  serious 
deficiencies of this system of private enforcement  that arise because the 
costs of operating  the legal system create a divergence between actual 
private incentives to sue and those that would lead to socially optimal 
results. Steven Shavell reached two major  conclusions in his analysis of 
this problem.1  First, he concluded  that, in general,  there is no systematic 
relationship  between the social and the private  benefits of bringing  suit.2 
Moreover, no obvious modification  of the incentive structure  governing 
private litigation can overcome this divergence. This far-reaching  and 
important  conclusion unfortunately  has not received the attention  it de- 
serves. Second, Shavell noted that  litigation  contains  a built-in  externality 
in that the private costs of suit are generally less than the social costs, 
given that the plaintiff  does not bear  the defendant's  or any public  costs of 
suit. 
* Assistant Professor, Harvard  Law School, and Faculty Research Fellow, National 
Bureau  of Economic  Research.  I wish to thank  Lucian  Bebchuk,  Peter  Menell,  and Steven 
Shavell  for helpful  comments. 
' Steven Shavell, The Social versus the Private  Incentive  to Bring  Suit in a Costly Legal 
System, 11 J. Legal Stud. 333 (1982). 
2 In all the models  examined  here, private  benefits  are simply  the damage  award,  whereas 
social benefits  consist of the reduction  in accident  costs resulting  from  the deterrence  effect 
of private suits. (Since deterrence increases care and thus decreases the probability  of 
accidents, there are also fewer suits, leading  to savings in litigation  costs relative  to what 
they would  have been without  the deterrent  effect but  assuming  suits  still  were brought.  This 
interaction  makes it more difficult  to make a clear conceptual  distinction  between social 
costs and  benefits  in Shavell's  model.)  Since the social benefits  depend,  among  other  things, 
on the costs and  effectiveness  of care-neither of which  are part  of the plaintiff's  calculus- 
private  and social benefits  would be in alignment  only by chance. (It should  be noted that, 
although  the discussion proceeds using the rhetoric  of accident  law, the argument  is quite 
general.) 
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Peter Menell  has criticized  this latter conclusion  on the ground "that 
the tendency  toward excessive  litigation implied by Shavell's  analysis is 
overridden  by  the  injuring party's  ability to  influence  the  likelihood  of 
suit.  '3 In the context of his model, Menell proves that an efficient result is 
produced by the injurer's decision  about the amount of damage to cause, 
which in turn affects  whether it will be profitable for the injured party to 
sue. His analysis implicitly takes as given the legal rules-procedural  and 
substantive-that  govern  liability  and  the  assignment  of  the  costs  of 
litigation. 
Menell's  argument, although correct,  in fact does not disturb Shavell's 
initial conclusions.  Shavell's  analysis  of the divergence  between  private 
and social costs  should be understood as questioning the efficiency of the 
panoply of legal rules governing liability. Notwithstanding  Menell's  dem- 
onstration,  I will  show  that Shavell's  argument is sufficient to establish 
the externality  that litigation costs  create.  This conclusion  suggests  the 
possibility  of  remedial  action  through  modifying  the  legal  system  that 
Menell implicitly takes as given. 
Section  I  explains  the  intuition  behind  Menell's  argument,  which 
clarifies the nature of his implicit assumptions  and thereby  makes clear 
that his result is not in conflict  with the claim that there exists  a diver- 
gence  between  private and social  costs  in private litigation.  The results 
are developed  using  numerical  examples  in  Section  II and are proved 
formally in Section  III.4 Section  IV offers some concluding remarks con- 
cerning  the  significance  of  these  issues.  Finally,  the  Appendix  briefly 
demonstrates  that Menell's  efficiency  result-in  addition to being inde- 
pendent  of  the  existence  of  a  divergence  between  private  and  social 
costs-is,  in part, a function  of his model's  assumption,  standard in this 
literature, that litigation costs  are independent of the amount at stake. 
I.  THE  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MENELL'S  AND SHAVELL'S RESULTS 
Menell's approach involves  examining the injurer's actions before harm 
is imposed.  In particular, he focuses  on the standard nuisance example in 
which the injurer's level  of output determines  the level  of pollution and 
thus the level  of damage to the victim.  Menell begins by noting, as does 
Shavell,  that the plaintiff will sue if and only if damages exceed  the plain- 
3 Peter S.  Menell,  A Note  on Private versus  Social  Incentives  to Sue in a Costly  Legal 
System,  12 J. Legal Stud. 41, 41 (1983); see also id. at 52 ("Thus the structure of the legal 
system  implicitly internalizes  the costs  of litigation"). 
4  Sections  I and II are self-contained  so that readers who prefer the numerical examples 
to a more formal derivation can omit all but subsection  D of Section III without a significant 
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tiff's litigation  costs.5 Since the prospective  defendant's  ex ante behavior 
determines  the level of damages, the critical  insight  is that the defendant 
can influence  whether  the plaintiff  will sue. In particular,  if the defendant 
reduces output so that damages  are below the plaintiff's  cost of suit, the 
plaintiff's incentive to sue will be eliminated. 
More specifically, Menell correctly  explains how the injurer's  decision 
to increase  output  just beyond the suit threshold  point  will cost the injurer 
the sum of the plaintiff's  and the defendant's  litigation  costs. The injurer 
obviously bears its own litigation costs if it crosses the suit preclusion 
threshold.  Moreover, since the plaintiff  will choose to sue precisely at the 
point where damages  equal (or  just exceed) its litigation  costs, the defen- 
dant's damages  will just equal the plaintiff's  litigation  costs when output 
is at the threshold  point. 
Menell's important  observation  is that this result is socially desirable. 
The social cost of the defendant's  crossing the litigation  threshold  equals 
the sum of the parties' litigation  costs, so crossing the threshold  will be 
efficient  if and only if the extra profit  to be earned is sufficient  to cover 
both sets of litigation costs.  The injurer's extra profit from producing 
whatever  level of output it selects beyond the threshold  amount  is net of 
the extra damages  caused because they must  be paid  to the victim. There- 
fore, the injurer's  overall decision between a low, suit-precluding  output 
level and a higher  output  level that results  in suit correctly  balances  all the 
costs and benefits. The injurer  receives the additional  profits  from greater 
output,  but it bears all the additional  damages  to the victim as well as the 
litigation  costs of both parties (its own directly and the plaintiff's indi- 
rectly, as suggested by the preceding argument).  Menell's conclusion, 
which  he proves rigorously,  is therefore  that  the injurer  takes into account 
all litigation  costs in making  its decisions.6 On the basis of this result, he 
argues  that there is no externality  problem  as Shavell suggested. 
Within  the confines of his model, Menell's argument  is entirely  correct 
until this final step.  It is also important  in its own right. The simple 
implication  is that, if one sets aside the many other possible divergences 
5 Issues of uncertainty,  risk  aversion,  endogeneity  of litigation  costs, and  other  complica- 
tions concerning  lawsuits are ignored since they do not affect the basic argument  or the 
response.  In addition,  I will follow Menell  and  Shavell  in ignoring  that  the plaintiff  might  sue 
strategically-that  is, even if damages  do not exceed litigation  costs, it might  hope  to extract 
a settlement by threatening  the defendant  with going forward  despite the cost. All the 
assumptions  used in Menell's argument  will not be repeated  here. Nor will any attempt  be 
made  to assess the general  approach  used by Menell  or Shavell,  including  their  definition  of 
social  welfare. This note is limited  to examining  which of their conclusions  follow within 
their  chosen frameworks  and some of the differences  between their models. 
6 As the Appendix  demonstrates,  this argument  is subject  to qualification  if litigation  costs 
are  a function  of the amount  at stake. 374  THE  JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
that  could  lead  to  second-best  arguments for  intervention,  there  is  no 
justification  for any action to alter injurers' strategic behavior in making 
lawsuits  unprofitable  for  plaintiffs  by  reducing  the  level  of  damages. 
Given  Shavell's  arguments concerning  divergences  between  private and 
social  benefits and the possibility  in more general models for the level  of 
care  taken to affect the probability of harm, however,  there may indeed 
be  reason  to  fear defendants'  strategic  behavior.  Shavell  demonstrated 
that  suits will be too infrequent precisely  when damages in a single case 
are  too  low to make it worthwhile for plaintiffs to sue. To the extent that 
injurers'  ex  ante  strategic behavior  can make this scenario  more likely, 
there  could be a problem with inefficient suit preclusion in addition to that 
noted  in the Appendix. 
Despite  the accuracy  of Menell's  analysis,  however,  it does not follow 
from  the social  efficiency  of the injurer's decision  that there is no diver- 
gence  between  the private and the social costs  of suit. It is still the case, 
as  Shavell argued, that the plaintiff bears only its own legal costs; costs of 
the  defendant constitute  an externality.7 This externality is not addressed 
by  Menell's  analysis because  of his implicit assumption that rules govern- 
ing  liability and litigation costs  are not subject to modification. The pri- 
vate/social cost  divergence  itself is thus taken as a given. 
The  confusion  arises because  Menell does  not address the question of 
whether  there is a cost externality to the plaintiff's decision to bring suit. 
Instead, his investigation  considers  only whether there is an externality 
involved in the defendant's  decision  to preclude suit, taking as given any 
externality problem  that may  exist  with  the  plaintiff's  decision-making 
process.  Shavell's  demonstration  of  the  private/social  cost  divergence 
leads, ceteris paribus, to an excessive  incentive for the plaintiff to sue.  It 
therefore follows  that sometimes  it might be efficient for society  to adopt 
legal rules that prohibit or otherwise  discourage suit, including the impor- 
tant possibility  of substituting alternative modes of compensation  or dis- 
pute resolution.  Shavell's  conclusion  does  not address the efficiency  of 
injurers' actions  that discourage  suit, given the prevailing legal regime. 
II.  NUMERICAL  ILLUSTRATION  OF  RESULTS 
The examples  that are necessary  to prove  the results  can be derived 
from Table  1, which is a modified version  of a similar set of illustrations 
used by Menell. This illustration is constructed  so that the private and the 
social benefits  of suit are equal, and it demonstrates  that the divergence 
7 Of course, any public costs, for example, those of the court system, are also omitted 
from  the plaintiff's  decision calculus. TABLE  1 
ILLUSTRATION  OF  PRIVATE/SOCIAL  COST  DIVERGENCE  IN ABSENCE  OF 
PRIVATE/SOCIAL  BENEFIT  DIVERGENCE 
Net:  Case A  Net:  Case B 
P'  D'  P  D  (a  =  15, b  =  30)  (a  =  b  =  30) 
x  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1  100  1  100  1  100  100 
2  90  3  190  4  190  190 
3  80  6  270  10  270  270 
4  70  10  340  20  290  340 
5  50  20  390  40  320  320 
6  20  60  410  100  280  310 
[30]  [70] 
7  -  10  100  400  200  170  260 
[40]  [110] 
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between  private and social costs  still exists  and can lead to an inefficient 
outcome.  The injurer's output level is indicated by x in Table 1. Columns 
1 and 2 indicate the marginal profits of the injurer (P')  and the marginal 
damages of the victim (D') from each unit of output. Total profits (P)  and 
total damages (D) appear next-for  example,  at x  =  3, P  =  270 =  100 + 
90  +  80. The litigation costs  for the victim (plaintiff) and injurer (defen- 
dant) are, respectively,  a and b. 
In case  A,  litigation costs  are assumed  to be  15 for the plaintiff and 30 
for the defendant.  In case  B,  litigation costs  are 30 for both parties,  and 
the numbers in brackets  are used  instead.  Columns 5 and 6 refer to the 
injurer's net profits in each instance.  Net profits simply equal P when the 
plaintiff does not sue, and they equal P  -  D  -  b when the plaintiff finds it 
profitable to sue.  For example,  the 280 figure in column 5 equals 410  - 
100  -  30. 
In both cases,  the socially  optimal output (in the absence  of litigation 
costs)  is 5 units: up to that point,  additional profits exceed  further dam- 
ages,  whereas  for the  sixth  unit of output,  marginal damages  (60 or 30) 
exceed  marginal profits (20). The injurer's output would be 6 if suit were 
legally precluded:  all units up to that point increase  profits; the seventh 
unit decreases  profits by  10. 
In case  A,  the  social  benefit of  suit is 40 (suit reduces  output from 6 
units to 5, yielding a gain of 60  -  20). The private benefit is also 40 since 
the injurer, in the presence  of costly  litigation as assumed in the example, 
will produce 5 units and thus cause  damages of 40.8 
8 The injurer will not find it profitable to preclude suit in this example, as is implied by the 
demonstration below that it would be socially  undesirable (combined with the earlier expla- 
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Although the private and the social benefits are equal, the private and 
the  social  costs  are  not.  The  private  cost  of  litigation  is  15 since  the 
plaintiff bears  only  its own  litigation costs.  If the defendant's  litigation 
costs  were less than 25, say,  15, then the social costs  of permitting use of 
the legal system  would be 30, which is less than the benefits of 40, so the 
rule holding the injurer liable would be desirable.  But in the posited  ex- 
ample,  the  defendant's  litigation  costs  are 30,  so  the  social  cost  is 45, 
making liability undesirable.  If suit were  legally prohibited, 40 in social 
benefits would be sacrificed, but 45 in social costs would be saved. There- 
fore there is an excessive  private incentive  on the part of the plaintiff to 
litigate: its private costs  are less  than the benefits even though the social 
costs  are greater.9 
9 If the plaintiff,  even though  victorious  (note this is stricter  than  the British  rule),  had  to 
pay defendant's  litigation  costs, the result  in this instance  would  be the unconstrained  social 
optimum  (that is, the optimum  that would prevail  in the absence of litigation  costs). The 
equilibrium  would be with an output  of 5, which would make  it unprofitable  for plaintiff  to 
sue, and since there are no suits, no litigation  costs would be incurred. 
The conclusion that the unconstrained  social optimum  can be reached  by such a cost- 
shifting  rule  does not generalize  in a number  of respects. First,  in a model  like Shavell's  (see 
note 19 infra),  so long as the probability  of an accident  is not reduced  to zero and litigation 
costs are less than  the loss resulting  from  an accident-neither condition  being  inconsistent 
with private/social  convergence  of costs and benefits-there will always  be some litigation 
and  thus some litigation  costs (assuming  a rule  of strict  liability).  Second,  in Menell's  model, 
there can be an equilibrium  without suit preclusion  that involves no private/social  diver- 
gences. Therefore,  litigation  costs are not necessarily  avoided. 
Third,  in Menell's model, one cannot  expect private/social  benefit  convergence  through- 
out the relevant  range.  Private  benefit  equals  damages,  which are assumed  to increase  with 
output, which was a necessary condition for the optimality  result above. Convergence 
would  therefore  require  that  the social  benefits  of suit  also increase  with  output.  That  implies 
that  profits  are  rising  faster  than  damages,  which  cannot  be true  where  marginal  profit  equals 
marginal  damages  or at higher  levels of output. (Benefit  convergence  can exist in Table 1, 
case A, at the unconstrained  optimum  output level only because the example is discrete 
rather  than  continuous.)  More  generally,  benefit  convergence  is itself a happenstance  event, 
so to expect that happenstance  result  to hold over a range  of output  and  not  just at any one 
point would be quite farfetched. 
Finally, it is worth considering  more generally  the possible effects of making  plaintiffs 
(even when victorious)  bear defendants'  litigation  costs in Menell's  model. There  are three 
relevant  situations.  (1) Equilibrium  before  and  after  the change  in cost rules  is characterized 
by the plaintiff's  bringing  suit. In this instance,  the defendant's  output  and  social  benefits  are 
unchanged,  and  the same social costs are incurred.  Fee shifting  would  thus  be irrelevant.  (2) 
The change  converts an equilibrium  involving  suit to an injurer  suit preclusion  equilibrium, 
which  is possible because higher  plaintiff  litigation  costs imply  that suit preclusion  entails  a 
higher,  more profitable  level of output.  (This possibility  argument  also shows why a fourth 
case of moving  from suit preclusion  to equilibrium  with suit is not a possible result.)  This 
would  entail  a net social benefit.  Menell's  proof  directly  implies  that the new equilibrium  is 
more efficient  than  forcing  litigation  under  the new circumstances,  and  forcing  litigation  in 
turn  would entail the same output  and litigation  costs as in the initial  situation  (this is the 
argument  in case 1);  therefore,  the result  follows. (3) Equilibrium  before  and  after  the change 
involves suit preclusion.  The change  will increase  equilibrium  output,  which  will increase  or 
decrease  net benefits,  depending  on whether  output  is thereby  closer to or farther  from  the 377  PRIVATE  VERSUS SOCIAL  COSTS 
Note that this inefficiency  arises even though the injurer's decision  not 
to  preclude suit was efficient, taking as given the private/social cost diver- 
gence facing the plaintiff. Preclusion  would require an output of 3: total 
damages  of 10 are insufficient to induce the victim to bear litigation costs 
of 15, but if output were increased  to 4, total damages would be 20, and 
the  victim would sue. The injurer's attempt to preclude suit would cost 90 
in  benefits ([70 +  50] -  [10 +  20])  the effect of reducing output from 5 
to 3-while  saving only 45 in costs.  Thus the injurer's behavior in failing 
to  preclude suit, proved efficient by Menell, does not negate the possibil- 
ity  that it might be socially efficient to prohibit suit even when the injurer 
does not,  which  is  one  important implication  of  the private/social  cost 
divergence argument. This conclusion  is possible  because  the conditions 
guaranteeing the efficiency  of the injurer's suit preclusion  decision  have 
no direct bearing on the conditions  necessary  for victims' private suits to 
be socially  efficient. 
To complete  the analysis,  consider case  B in this illustration. Here the 
injurer  will find it profitable to preclude suit by producing only 4 units. At 
that output,  damages  are only  20, which  does  not fully cover  the plain- 
tiff's costs,  assumed  in this  case  to  be  30.  The  injurer sacrifices  50 in 
potential profits by not producing the fifth unit but saves  30 in litigation 
costs  plus  40  in  damages.  Once  again,  as  Menell  proved  for  all  such 
situations, this decision  by the injurer is efficient,  taking as given all the 
circumstances.  The added unit of output has a social  benefit of only  30 
(50 -  20), whereas  litigation costs  of 60 are avoided.  But once  again it 
would be efficient if the plaintiff were barred from suit. In that case,  the 
injurer  would produce 6 units rather than 4, the increase in profit would be 
70 (50  +  20), and the increase  in damages would be only 50 (20  +  30). 
The reason  there  is  a  gain  is  that  the  plaintiff's  incentive  to  sue  re- 
sults in excessively  cautious  behavior by the injurer.10 
There still remains  some  ambiguity in interpreting this final case  be- 
cause, at the equilibrium output of 4, the social benefits of suit are -  20, as 
indicated by the preceding calculation.  Because  the suit preclusion equi- 
librium entails  no litigation costs,  any inefficiency  of the sort described 
here must be due to divergences  in benefits. More generally, since private 
unconstrained  optimal  output  level. (Cases involving  crossovers  could only be resolved  by 
direct  measurement  of profits  and damages.)  Of course, all these results  are limited  to the 
special  assumptions  of Menell's model, and different  conclusions  are quite possible in the 
general  situation.  See, for example, text following  note 6 supra. 
10  By now it should  be obvious that  one could readily  construct  examples  involving  a suit 
preclusion  equilibrium  wherein  the rule permitting  the plaintiff  to sue, even given the cost 
externality  problem, would be desirable. Using the damage figures  from case A would 
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benefits are greater than zero at such an equilibrium, the assumption that 
social and private benefits are equal would imply positive  social benefits 
at that equilibrium, so there could be no net gain from legally prohibiting 
suit.  Finally,  in that situation,  no general conclusion  can be made con- 
cerning the  desirability  of  closing  the  divergence  between  private  and 
social costs;  such action would increase equilibrium output, which may or 
may not be desirable because equilibrium output initially may be below or 
above  the unconstrained  social optimum. 
III.  PROOF  OF  RESULTS 
A.  Preliminaries 
The derivations will use the following  notation: 
x  =  injurer's output; 
P(x)  =  gross profits of injurer; at x  =  0, P' >  0; P" <  0; 
D(x)  =  gross damages of victim; D'  >  0; D" >  0; 
a  =  plaintiff's  (victim's)  litigation costs;  and 
b  =  defendant's  (injurer's) litigation costs. 
If there is no liability,ll  the injurer simply maximizes P(x). This maximum 
occurs  at P'(x)  -  0. The "unconstrained"  output level,  x,,  will refer to 
this level  of output.12 
The victim's decision rule is to sue if and only if D(x) >  a. 13  Thus, if the 
liability rule permits suit, the injurer can preclude suit by choosing x such 
that D(x) c  a.  Since profits increase with the level  of output, the injurer 
will choose  x to guarantee precise  equality.T4  This level  of output is de- 
noted Xp  to refer to the suit preclusion outcome. 
The injurer's other option is to set x >  Xp  so that suit will result. In that 
case,  the injurer would maximize P(x)  -  D(x)  -  b; the solution implies 
that P'(x)  =  D'(x).  The level  of output that solves  this equation will be 
11 This case is meant to encompass  any rule prohibiting suit, procedural or substantive. It 
is to be distinguished from the case  in which the plaintiff will not sue even though there is 
liability-referred  to here as the suit preclusion outcome. 
12 If P' >  0 for all x, xu would be infinite, in which case  the social benefits of permitting 
suit would also be infinite so long as D' >  P' for some x; if not, there could not be any social 
benefits to suit.  Neither  case  will be considered  further. 
13 Here and elsewhere,  arbitrary choices  will be made for cases  of precise  indifference, 
that is, when D(x) =  a. Such assumptions have no effect on the interpretation of the results. 
14 This is not precisely  correct.  Since  P" <  0, it is possible  that even  the unconstrained 
output level  would preclude suit, that is, D(x,,) <  a, in which case  the existence  of liability 
has no constraining effect.  Since liability is irrelevant in such instances,  this case will not be 
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referred to as x*. Note  that this is also the socially optimal level of output 
in the sense  that it maximizes  social  welfare in the absence  of litigation 
costs (and this output would result in the absence  of litigation costs  since 
no other imperfections are assumed to exist); it also is the optimum, given 
that litigation will result. The injurer will find the suit preclusion equilib- 
rium maximizing  if and only  if 
P(xp) > P(x*)  -  D(x*)  -  b.  (1) 
B.  Menell's  Result 
Menell proves  that, given that the legal rule permits suit, the injurer's 
decision whether  to preclude  suit is efficient.  This result follows  from a 
simple proof.  A  suit preclusion  equilibrium is socially  preferable to one 
involving suit if and only if 
P(xp)  -  D(xp) > P(x*)  - D(x*)  -  a  -  b.  (2) 
The existence  of  a suit preclusion  equilibrium implies  that D(xp)  =  a. 
Therefore (2) becomes 
P(xp)  -  a >  P(x*)  -  D(x*)  -  a  -  b,  (3) 
which is equivalent  to 
P(xp) >  P(x*)  - D(x*)  -  b.  (4) 
This statement  of the rule for the social  optimum is identical to (1), the 
statement of the injurer's decision  rule, so the injurer's decision  will be 
efficient.15 
C.  Prohibiting  Suit by Rule 
Consider first the case  in which  the equilibrium that is reached when 
suit is permitted involves  suit. Then a rule prohibiting suit by the plaintiff 
(no matter what the level of damages sustained) would be desirable if and 
only if the net social benefits when output is unconstrained exceed  the net 
social benefits when the injurer's output is constrained by suit; the latter 
total includes  the costs  of litigation,  while the former does  not. This can 
be expressed  as 
P(x,)  -  D(x,)  >  P(x*)  - D(x*)  -  a  -  b.  (5) 
15 The Appendix  addresses  how this conclusion  must  be modified  if litigation  costs are a 
function  of the amount  at stake. 
Note that, if Xp  > x*, there  will necessarily  be a suit preclusion  equilibrium  since P(xp) > 
P(x*) (recalling  the qualification  in note 14 supra  that  xu > xp). Since the derivation  in text 
does not assume that Xp  <  x*-unlike  the heuristic discussion and later examples-no 
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It  should be immediately apparent that inequality (4) failing to hold (that 
is,  an equilibrium involving  suit being more efficient than the injurer pre- 
cluding  suit by constraining its output) provides  insufficient information 
to  determine  whether  (5) holds,  that is,  whether  a rule prohibiting suit 
would  be desirable. 
To  focus  on whether  (5) could hold solely  because  of divergences  be- 
tween  private and social  litigation costs,16 one  needs  to add the further 
constraint  that private and social  benefits of suit are equal.17 (Note  that 
"benefits"  here refers only to effects on the injurer's behavior, not to the 
net  benefits,  which  would  subtract litigation costs.  This terminology  is 
employed  specifically to isolate the litigation cost component of the prob- 
lem.)  This constraint is necessary  because  Shavell's  first conclusion,  un- 
challenged by  Menell,  indicates  that  private  and  social  benefit  diver- 
gences  can independently  be responsible  for inefficient private litigation. 
Private  benefits  (the plaintiff's  benefits from bringing suit) are simply 
D(x*).  Social benefits are defined as the difference between (i) the excess 
of  profits over  damages when  suit is permitted and (ii) the excess  when 
suit  is prohibited. This equality of private and social benefits implies that 
D(x*) =  [P(x*)  -  D  (x*)]  -  [P(xu)  - D(xu)].  (6) 
Rearranging  terms yields 
[P(xu) - D(x,)]  -  [P(x*)  - D(x*)]  =  -D(x*).  (7) 
Since  this case involves  suit, D(x*)  > a, so  -ZD(x*)  < -a.  Substituting in 
(7)  gives 
[P(xu) -  D(xu)]  -  [P(x*)  -  D(x*)]  < -a.  (8) 
Rearranging  terms in (5) in a parallel manner yields 
[P(xu) 
-  D(xu)] -  [P(x*)  - D(x*)]  >  -a  -b.  (9) 
16 Menell's  critique of Shavell is clearly directed at the cost divergence issue (see Menell, 
supra note 3, at 41 & n.2); yet he does conclude that his model provides sufficient conditions 
for the "equivalence  of the private and social incentives to sue when litigation is costly" (id. 
at 50-51;  emphasis  added),  which,  by definition,  includes  the issue  of divergent benefits. 
This conclusion  obviously  fails  since  his analysis  in no way addresses  the issue  of benefit 
divergence. 
Menell similarly argues that, if the loser (which in his model is always the defendant) must 
bear all litigation costs  (the British rule), the "[e]quivalence  of the private and social incen- 
tives  to  sue  also  holds."  Id.  at 51.  He  notes  that,  under this  approach,  the plaintiff will 
always sue (in his model).  But this leads to a result equivalent to a forced suit equilibrium, 
which  Menell  earlier proved  inferior to  the  suit preclusion  equilibrium in those  cases  in 
which the injurer finds it profitable to select  that result! Menell is correct in asserting here 
that "suit occurs only if it is socially desirable" (id. at 52) precisely because he once again is 
taking as given the rest of the system,  which may give the plaintiff the wrong incentives. 
17 An examination  of Menell (id.) reveals  that private and social benefits of suit are not 
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Condition (8) is clearly insufficient to guarantee that condition (9) fails- 
that is,  that private suit should never be prohibited-unless  b  =  0. But 
that, of course,  is precisely the condition that there is no externality to the 
plaintiff's  decision  to sue.  When b >  0, it is possible  for condition (9) to 
hold.18 To prove the matter formally, it suffices to offer numerical exam- 
ples, each consistent  with all prior constraints, providing different results 
concerning the desirability of a rule prohibiting suit. Sufficient examples 
have been presented  in Section  II. 
Finally, consider the comparison in the case in which a rule permitting 
suit  involves  a  suit  preclusion  equilibrium as  a  result  of  the  injurer's 
finding it profit maximizing to constrain its output level sufficiently. In this 
case,  a rule prohibiting suit would be desirable if and only if 
P(xu)  -  D(xu)  >  P(xp)  -  D(xp).  (10) 
Once again, none of the prior qualifications suggests  any necessary  con- 
clusion concerning the direction of this inequality. Proof through numeri- 
cal examples  has been presented  in Section  II. It should be noted,  how- 
ever, that in this instance it is not possible  for a rule prohibiting suit to be 
desirable  solely  because  of  a  divergence  in costs  rather than in bene- 
fits. The simple reason is that, in this equilibrium, no litigation costs  are 
actually  incurred,  although  their  level  does  determine  Xp and  thus 
affects  whether  liability  is  desirable.  To  demonstrate  this,  rearrange 
(10) as follows: 
[P(x~)  -  D(x,)]  -  [P(xp)  -  D(xp)]  >  0.  (11) 
Then simply note that condition  (8)-which  is implied by the equality of 
private and social  benefits  (6)-is  sufficient to rule out this possibility. 
D.  Interpretation of Results 
The possibility  that a rule prohibiting suit might be desirable in either 
instance  is well  in accord  with intuition.  When a liability rule results in 
suits (that is, when a suit preclusion equilibrium is not efficient, given that 
suit is legally permissible),  it is possible  that litigation costs  will be sub- 
stantial even  though social  benefits from suit are minimal. Low  benefits 
result when suit has little effect on the injurer's behavior, as would be the 
case  where  the  unconstrained  level  of  output  (xu) is  not  significantly 
greater than the optimal level (x*). The constraint that the private benefits 
equal the meager social  benefits-an  equality that would result only  by 
sheer  coincidence-is  insufficient  to  rule out  the  undesirability  of  suit 
18 Inspection  of the additional  constraint  that condition  (1) fails-because  this case as- 
sumes that there is not a suit preclusion  equilibrium-indicates that this possibility  is still 
not eliminated,  as the examples  of Section II demonstrate. 382  THE  JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
since  the total social  costs  include not only the victim's  litigation costs, 
which  is all that it considers  in deciding whether to sue,  but the defen- 
dant's  as well.  Of course,  the possibility  of this result does  not in itself 
indicate  the practical significance of situations in which private litigation 
will  thus prove to be inefficient. 
When  the  use  of a liability rule results in a suit preclusion equilibrium, 
there  are no litigation costs,  and thus it might appear that a rule forbidding 
suit  offers no potential for further gain. This is not necessarily  the case, 
however,  because  it is possible  that the deterring effect of suit, resulting 
in  decreased output (Xp  rather than x*) results in more of a social cost than 
the  excessive  output that would result if suit were no longer permitted (xu 
rather  than  x*).  This result would occur when the possibility  of suit de- 
terred  output  substantially-as  might be  the  case  where  the  plaintiff's 
litigation  costs  were  small  but  the  defendant's  were  substantial-and 
when  the absence  of liability had only a modest effect in terms of exces- 
sive output.  Again,  this  only  demonstrates  the possibility  of this result 
without  providing any indication of its likelihood. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The  preceding analysis demonstrates that Menell came up with a differ- 
ent  answer from Shavell because  he asked a different question-focusing 
on  the efficiency  of the injurer's (prospective  defendant's) ex ante behav- 
ior  rather than on the efficiency of the victim's (plaintiff's) ex post behav- 
ior.  Neither question,  in the abstract, is the "right" one; both are relevant 
for different  purposes.  Thus  the  import  of  the  argument here  is  that 
Shavell's  original  claim  concerning  the  private/social  cost  divergence 
stands untouched.  Menell's  contribution has been to demonstrate an in- 
teresting but rather separate proposition concerning the efficiency  of the 
injurer's strategic behavior. 
It is also  worth keeping  in mind that any conclusions  concerning  the 
private/social cost  divergence  in terms of incentives  to sue can be highly 
misleading when  viewed  in isolation  because  of the general divergence 
between private and social benefits. Shavell illustrated well how, a priori, 
the combination of both divergences  could readily run in either direction, 
so no simple conclusions  concerning,  for example,  appropriate fee  shift- 
ing arrangements can be derived from this discussion.  Along those lines, 
the reader should note that the result that it may be socially optimal to ban 
suits (change a rule to one of no liability) was shown to be possible but not 
necessarily  likely. 
It is worth noting that this existence  result is not really new.  For ex- 
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a rule of no liability) argue in part that the social benefits of the liability 
system (in terms of deterrence) are likely to be small by comparison to the 
costs  of  operating  that system.  In addition,  some  of the arguments ad- 
vanced  in favor  of workers'  compensation  or other quasi-strict liability 
schemes  are motivated  by similar concerns.  More generally,  it is impor- 
tant to emphasize  that the references  throughout the preceding discussion 
to the option of legally prohibiting suit can be misleading if not interpreted 
broadly, in that alternatives to litigation-including  systems that incorpo- 
rate direct regulation as one component-rather  than a pure regime of no 
liability  would  often  be  the  appropriate response.  Taking  such  options 
into account increases  the potential significance of the effects  of litigation 
costs.  For  example,  it  might often  be  the  case  that a  costly  litigation 
system in its current form will be clearly superior to elimination of liability 
altogether (without providing any substitute) yet inferior to other systems 
that may  sacrifice,  for  example,  some  of  the  incentive  properties  of  a 
liability  system  in  exchange  for  savings  in  other  costs  or  for  better 
achievement  of other objectives. 
Shavell and Menell have each offered different models19 and some dif- 
ferent (although not necessarily  inconsistent)  conclusions  concerning the 
incentive to sue when litigation is costly.  Since the efficiency of the entire 
private  law  system-either  by  comparison  to  eliminating  liability  al- 
together or to other forms of social regulation-depends  on the operation 
of the litigation system,  which is the subject of these  investigations,  it is 
important that far greater attention be devoted  to studying these  issues. 
APPENDIX 
RESULTS  WHERE  LITIGATION  COSTS INCREASE  WITH 
THE  LEVEL  OF DAMAGES 
The model presented  in Section III as well as in the rest of the analysis  in this 
note followed both Menell and Shavell in assuming  that litigation  costs, a and b, 
19  It should  also be noted that  Menell's  model, which  is used in this investigation,  focuses 
on the activity level rather  than on the level of care, the latter having  been the focus of 
Shavell's inquiry. For a discussion of some of the differences  between these issues, see 
Steven Shavell, Strict Liability  versus Negligence,  9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980);  Menell, supra 
note 3, at 49-50, 52. As Menell  notes, the difference  in examples  has some relevance  to the 
applicability  of Menell's argument  even if it were correct. In particular,  Menell's effect 
results  from  the injurer's  ex ante decision  leading  to a smaller  magnitude  of injury,  whereas 
some types of care may decrease the probability  of injury.  Suit only arises in the event of 
harm, so greater care that affects only the probability  would not enable the injurer  to 
preclude  suit in the manner  suggested  by Menell's examples. 384  THE JOURNAL  OF LEGAL STUDIES 
were constant.  It might, however,  be more realistic to assume that litigation costs 
increase with the amount at stake,  which in this model is D(x).20 
This modification of the original assumption, however,  affects none of the anal- 
ysis establishing the existence  of a divergence between private and social costs  in 
plaintiffs' decisions  to bring suit since that result depended only on the fact that 
the plaintiff does not bear the total costs of litigation, whatever that total might be. 
It does,  however,  modify Menell's  separate conclusion  that the decision  of injur- 
ers concerning  whether to preclude  suit is efficient,  as will now be established. 
REVISED  MODEL 
If litigation costs  increased  with the stakes,  the model in Section  III could be 
modified simply by replacing a and b with a(D(x))  and b(D(x)),  where a(0) >  0, 
0 <  a'  <  1, and likewise  for b. (That is,  litigation costs  for any suit are strictly 
positive,  and litigation costs  increase  with the stakes  but do not increase  faster 
than the stakes.)  Then equations  (1)-(4)  would become: 
P(xp) >  P(x*)  -  D(x*)  -  b(D(x*))  (1') 
P(xp)  -  D(xp) >  P(x*)  -  D(x*)  -  a(D(x*))  -  b(D(x*))  (2') 
P(xp)  -  a(D(xp))  >  P(x*)  -  D(x*)  -  a(D(x*))  -  b(D(x*))  (3') 
P(xp) >  P(x*)  -  D(x*)  -  b(D(x*))  -  [a(D(x*))  -  a(D(xp))].  (4') 
Comparing equations  (4') and (1') reveals  that the social and the private deci- 
sion rules are no longer identical.  First, consider the case in which Xp< x*, which 
implies  that  a(D(xp))  <  a(D(x*)),  making the  bracketed  term  in  equation  (4') 
positive.  This  implies  that  the  injurer does  not  fully  internalize  the  victim's 
litigation costs.  As  reexamination  of the earlier intuitive argument suggests,  the 
injurer only internalizes  the victim's  litigation costs  measured at the suit preclu- 
sion  equilibrium,  a(D(xp)).  The  increase  in  litigation  costs  beyond  that  point, 
a(D(x*))  -  a(D(xp)),  is an externality,  so  it now becomes  possible  that the in- 
jurer will not preclude  suit even  if it is socially  efficient. 
In the case in which Xp  >  x*, there is necessarily  a suit preclusion equilibrium. 
In  this  instance,  the  internalized  litigation  costs  of  the  plaintiff exceed  those 
resulting when  suit is  brought: a(D(xp)) >  a(D(x*)).  It is therefore possible  for 
there to be a suit preclusion  equilibrium that is inefficient. 
INTERPRETATION 
The conclusion  is that variable litigation costs  create  some private/social  cost 
divergence  in injurers' decisions  to preclude suit. The problem is that the injurer 
considers  a(D(xp))-the  victim's  litigation  costs  corresponding  to  the  damage 
level  at the suit preclusion  equilibrium-rather  than a(D(x*)),  the victim's  litiga- 
tion costs  corresponding  to the damage level  that would prevail at the optimum 
output level,  given  suit.  In Menell's  model,  since litigation costs  were constant, 
20 The intuition  behind this new assumption  is clear enough. The greater  the stakes in 
litigation,  the more each side should  be prepared  to spend in order  to achieve the desired 
result.  One  would  expect that  a firm  will spend  more  to bring  or defend  a $1,000,000  suit  than 
one involving only $1,000 in damages, even if the legal and factual issues are otherwise 
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these two magnitudes were equal,  so there was no private/social cost divergence 
in the injurer's decision  to preclude  suit. 
Interpreting the second case-inefficient  suit preclusion-illustrates  how these 
modified results can be understood intuitively.  Inefficient suit preclusion results in 
this model when a suit preclusion equilibrium entails high damages and, therefore, 
high litigation costs for the victim-sufficiently  high to deter suit-even  when suit 
would result in much lower damages-because  of the ex ante effect on the injur- 
er's behavior-and  therefore much lower litigation costs.  In this event,  consider 
the effect of forcing victims to sue or, more plausibly, of inducing them to sue by 
subsidizing  their  litigation  costs.  The  resulting  ex  ante  effect  on  the  injurer's 
behavior implies that both damages and actual litigation costs  incurred (including 
the costs  covered  by the subsidy) would be low,  resulting in substantial benefits 
from litigation  at little  cost.  This  result follows  even  though-since  it is  a suit 
preclusion equilibrium from which the analysis began-the  plaintiff's actual litiga- 
tion costs  (before subsidy) exceed  the damages inflicted (which created the neces- 
sity for considering  subsidization  in the first instance).21 
21 The claim in the text that in this case a(D(x*)) >  D(x*) follows because a'  <  1, 
combined  with the assumption  that xp > x* and the definition  of xp, which requires  that 
a(D(xp)) =  D(xp). 